WW2 Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Report

For sale is a Report by the supreme allied commander, Mediterranean, to the Combined chiefs of staff on the operations in southern France, August, 1944. This is in good condition, and was published in 1947 by his majesty’s stationary office. 

  This is 48 pages long, and in good condition.    Introduction states as followed:   “BACKGROUND OF THE PLAN THE decision to launch an amphibious operation against the shores of Southern France in conjunction with a major invasion effort in Northern France in 1944, and the carly planning for such an operation in the Mediterranean Theatre, ante-date my assumption of command in that Theatre. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had decided on a diversionary allack on Southern France as early as the QUADRANT Conference in Quebec the preceding August, but the decision for a major, assault was taken by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the SEXTANT Conference held in Cairo late in November, 1943, which I attended in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The decision was subsequently embodied in agreements with Soviet Russia reached at the Teheran Conference, where Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt conferred with Marshal Stalin. These agreements were concluded at the highest level, and subsequently Mr. Churchill quoted President Roosevelt as saying "in view of the Soviet-British-American agreement reached in Teheran, I cannot agree without Stalin's approval to any use of force or equipment elsewhere that might delay or hazard the success " of either of these two complementary operations which were to create the " Second Front " in Europe. In fact, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to postpone amphibious operations tentatively scheduled for 1944 in the Bay of Bengal until 1945, in order to divert the necessary landing-craft to support the European operations. In their final report, they described the two assaults On France as the "Supreme Operations " of 1944. On 6th December, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff advised General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force, that the operation in his Theatre was to be launched in conjunction with the assault on Northern France mounted from the United Kingdom, and that the object was to be the establishment of a bridgehead on the South Coast of France, with subsequent exploitation northward in support of the northern invasion. The exact target date for the latter had not yet been determined, but was tentatively set for the " most suitable date during May, 1944? The Mediterranean operation was to be timed approximately to coincide with the Northern assault, and its exact date was to be set in consultation with the planning staff in the United Kingdom who were charged with planning the main invasion. General Eisenhower was informed that he would be given assault shipping and craft for a lift of at least two divisions, and he was directed to inform the Combined Chiefs of his requirements which could not be met from resources already available in the Mediterranean. In assessing these resources he was to assume that the forces already committed to the Italian campaign had advanced as far as the Pisa-Rimini line, where they were to maintain the strongest pressure possible without detracting from the new operation, and that no forces were committed to any other offensive operation in the Theatre. During the next two weeks the Joint Planning Staff proceeded vigorously Eisenhower, the projected operation, " with the draft of an appreciation and outline plan. In the words of General instead of a diversionary threat as formerly envisaged which would land only in the event of little opposition, had become an operation of major proportion." It would probably employ a corps of three united states divisions, two of which at least would probably be employed in the assault, and planning was based on an eventual build-up to ten divisions. From the beginning it was decided to utilise French divisions, at least in the follow-up formations. General Eisenhower pointed out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that an experienced Army Headquarters was needed for the detailed planning and operational control of such an undertaking and requested permission-which was promptly granted- to retain Seventh Army Headquarters in the Theatre for the task. The following day, 17th December, he advised them that the preliminary appreciations upon which the planning was based pointed to the compelling need for a heavier assault force, three divisions instead of the two originally proposed, if the necessary landing craft could be made available. Pending examination of available resources to determine whether the assault force was to comprise two or three divisions, the planners prepared an outline to cover both contingencies.”   This will be sent via Royal Mail 1st class signed for and dispatched within two working days.